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THE COMPLEXITY OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF AI SYSTEMS*
by
NORA OSMANI**
Technology  is  advancing  at a rapid  pace.  As we  anticipate  a rapid  increase
in artificial  intelligence  (AI),  we  may  soon  find  ourselves  dealing  with  fully
autonomous technology with the capacity to cause harm and injuries. What then?
Who is going to be held accountable if AI systems harm us? 
Currently  there  is  no  answer  to this  question  and  the existing  regulatory
framework  falls  short  in addressing  the accountability  regime  of autonomous
systems.  This  paper  analyses  criminal  liability  of AI  systems,  evaluated  under
the existing rules  of criminal  law.  It  highlights  the social  and legal  implications
of the current  criminal  liability  regime  as it  is  applied  to the complex  nature
of industrial  robots.  Finally,  the paper  explores  whether  corporate  liability  is
a viable option and what legal standards are possible for imposing criminal liability
on the companies who deploy AI systems. 
The paper reveals that traditional criminal law and legal theory are not well
positioned to answer the questions at hand, as there are many practical problems
that  require  further  evaluation.  I  have  demonstrated  that  with  the development
of AI,  more  questions  will  surface  and  legal  frameworks  will  inevitably  need
to adapt. The conclusions of this paper could be the basis for further research.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Robotics  and  AI  are  moving  towards  a Cambrian  explosion,1 given
the explosive and rapid developments in the field.  A lot of countries have
recognized  the enormous  importance  of the AI  industry2 and  are  now
actively  competing  for  the global  AI  market.3 In terms  of revolution,
machine learning created the ability for AI entities to accumulate experience
and learn from it.4 During an experiment, researchers from the Georgia Tech
Institute  fielded  two  autonomous  aircraft  (auto-piloted  airplanes),  which
shared  and  communicated  information  to each  other  using  data
communication software and Wi-Fi systems; thus no human control was
involved whatsoever.5
The self-development  ability  of AI  systems  presents  society  with
machines that have their own needs and goals, referred to in the literature
as Artificial  Super  Intelligence  (ASI).6 These  thinking  machines7 can  act
directly upon their environment,8 thus raising questions about liability for
1 Pratt,  GA.  (2015)  Is  a Cambrian  Explosion  Coming  for  Robotics?.  Journal  of Economic
Perspectives, 29 (3), p. 55.
2 Countries such as: Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
France, United Arab Emirates, Japan, Russia, and Israel aspire to participate in the global AI
market and are actively supporting the development of the AI industry through their tech-
-hubs. For more information, see: Deep Knowledge Analytics.  (2018)  Artificial Intelligence
Industry in the UK. [online] London: DKA. Available from: https://www.dka.global/ai-in-uk-
report [Accessed 12 May 2019].
3 China  and  the US  remain  the leaders  of the AI  race,  but  they  are  actively  competing
to outperform each other and to become leaders in the global IT market. Chinese President
Xi  Jinping  has  committed  $150  billion  in government  funding  in order  to make  China
the undisputed global leader in the AI race by 2030. Ibid.
4 Machine learning is described as an inductive method of learning in which the AI system
analyses various given data and identifies patterns for future use without being explicitly
programmed for that purpose.  In this  sense,  the computer’s  behaviour is not predictable
by either  the operator–owner  or the original  programmers.  See,  e.g.,  Vojislav,  K.  (2001)
Learning  and  Soft  Computing:  Support  Vector  Machines,  Neutral  Networks  and  Fuzzy  Logic
Models. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Karnow, C.E.A. (2013) The Application of Traditional
Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence. In: Ryan Calo, Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr
(eds.). Robot Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, pp. 51–77.
5 Toon,  J.  (2017)  Swarms  of Autonomous  Aerial  Vehicles  Test  New Dogfighting  Skills.  [online]
Atlanta:  GeorgiaTech.  Available  from:  http://www.rh.gatech.edu/news/590743/swarms-
autonomous-aerial-vehicles-test-new-dogfighting-skills [Accessed 15 May 2019].
6 Radutniy,  O.E.  (2017)  Criminal  Liability  of the Artificial  Intelligence.  Problems  of Legality,
(138), p. 136.
7 Hallevy, G. (2010) ‘I, Robot – I, Criminal’ – When Science Fiction Becomes Reality:  Legal
Liability of AI Robots Committing Criminal Offenses.  Syracuse Science and Technology Law
Reporter, 22 (Spring), p. 1. 
8 In his research, Calo defines robots as machines with three qualities: “(1) a robot can sense its
environment,  (2) a robot  has  the capacity  to process  the information  it  senses,  and  (3) a robot  is
organized to act directly upon its environment”. See: Calo, R. (2016)  Robots in American Law.
University  of Washington  School  of Law  Research  Paper  No. 2016-042.  Available  from:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2737598 [Accessed 22 June 2019].
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their  actions.  While  they  deliver  great  social  benefits,  can  society’s
interaction with robots also cause harm? 
In an increasingly automated world, these threats are becoming real and
many people have spoken out about their fears. At a tech conference that
took  place  on 6  November,  2017  in Lisbon,  Portugal,  the physicist
Dr. Stephen Hawking warned us about the dangers of AI, stating that AI can
be the worst case of human intelligence.9 The entrepreneur  Elon Musk  has
also  expressed  his  concerns.  He  calls  for  establishment  of a regulatory
authority that would monitor development of AI, citing it as the most likely
cause of World War III.10
The fact that the US Air Force (USAF) already uses some semi- and fully
autonomous technology and expects to increase these systems’ autonomy
in the future,11 gives  credence  to these  fears.  According  to a study
conducted by researchers from Oxford and Yale Universities, AI systems will
outperform humans in many activities in the next ten years.12
In our coexistence  with intelligent  agents,  one can naturally ask:  Who
should  be  sued  in court  if a robot  (that  is,  only  fully  autonomous  robots,  that
operate  without  human  control)  makes  a mistake,  thereby  killing,  or causing
serious  injuries? These  questions  have  been  puzzling  academics  and
researchers.  Even though this  problem has been addressed before,13 only
recently it  has attracted enough attention for a prompt examination.  Due
to the absence  of direct  legal  regulation  of AI,  the questions  at hand  still
remain  unclear.  The uncertainty  largely  stems  from  the complex  nature
9 See, for example: Murphy, M. (2017)  Stephen Hawking: AI Could Be Best – or Worst – Thing
in Human  History.  [online]  New  York  City:  MarketWatch.  Available  from:
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/stephen-hawking-ai-could-be-best-or-worst-thing-in-
human-history-2017-11-06 [Accessed 29 October 2018].
10 See, for example: Osborne, S. (2017) Elon Musk Calls for Urgent Laws on Robot as They
Will  Soon  Be  Risk  to Public.  Express,  28  November.  [online]  Available  from:
https://www.express.co.uk/news/science/885344/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-robotics-
regulation [Accessed 29 October 2018].
11 Palmer, A. (2010) Autonomous UAS: a partial solution to America’s future airpower needs.
[pre-print]  Submitted  to:  Air  University  in partial  fulfillment  of the graduation  requirements.
Available from: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1018416.pdf [Accessed 29 November
2018].
12 Grace,  K.  et al.  (2018)  Viewpoint:  When Will  AI  Exceed Human Performance? Evidence
from AI Experts. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 62, pp. 729–754.
13 See,  for  example:  Willick,  M.  (1983)  Artificial  Intelligence:  Some Legal  Approaches  and
Implications.  AI  Magazine,  4 (2),  p. 5.  Available  from:  https://aaai.org/ojs/index.php/
aimagazine/article/view/392 [Accessed 29 November 2018]; Karnow, C.E.A. (1996) Liability
for Distributed Artificial Intelligences.  Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 11 (1), pp. 147–204.
Available from: https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1115611?ln=en [Accessed 29 November
2018].
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of industrial robots and the multiple parties involved in the process of their
manufacture. 
The aim  of this  research  is  to outline  a comprehensive  analysis
of significant  liability  models  that  address  the responsibility  for  hazards
caused  by autonomous  systems.  This  paper  does  not  intend  to offer
a detailed  answer  for  the models  presented,  considering  that  such
an analysis  goes  beyond  a research  paper.  Therefore,  theories  and
explanations intend to serve the reader as guideposts to further exploration.
To limit  the scope  of the study,  the paper  primarily  reflects  a criminal
approach  to liability,  and  the focus  is  mostly  in the assessment  of fault
rather than in the allocation of cost. Thus, a tort law approach to providing
compensation for damage or physical injuries caused by AI systems is not
an object of analysis in this article. 
The paper  consists  of three  main  parts.  The first  part  examines  direct
liability  of AI  systems.  The matter  is  approached  by considering  that,
in the near  future,  robots  might  become  sophisticated  machines  having
human-like  abilities.  The paper  examines  whether  AI  agents  could  be
granted legal personhood and whether they can be held criminally liable for
their  actions.  The second  part  examines  whether  responsibility  can  be
allocated  to different  agents  in the production  chain,  i.e. imposing  strict
liability  on operators  of the AI  agents,  such  as  programmers,  designers,
owners, and other parties involved in the process of manufacturing. Finally,
corporate criminal liability is considered as a plausible method to address
the wrongdoings of autonomous systems. 
The article argues that current criminal law and the current legal system
are  not  well  positioned  to balance  a concern  for  physical  safety  with
incentivizing innovation of AI and industrial robots. The doctrine of direct
liability  of AI  systems  is  problematic  from  a normative  perspective.
In the absence  of a regulatory  framework governing  the legal  status  of AI
systems,  the question of whether AI systems could become legal  persons
remains  only  theoretical.  The concept  of AI  as a tool  and  strict  liability
of manufacturers  is  also  problematic,  as the plaintiff  may  find  it  very
difficult  to prove  that  the AI  system  was  defective  in the moment  it  left
the manufacturer  or its  developer.  On the other  hand,  there  are  no  clear
grounds  on which  to allocate  liability  of producers  based  on negligence.
With regard to AI systems as self-learning entities, it is hard to predict their
behaviours  and  define  the cause-effect  pattern;  therefore,  the operators
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of AI  systems  may  not  be  in a favourable  position  to foresee  risks  and
provide  due  diligence.  Given  the fact  that  AI  represents  a great  power
in the hands of giant  tech companies,  it  may fairly be said that corporate
liability  should  gain  more  attention  from  researchers,  academics,  and
policymakers.  However,  there  is  a need  for  an international  regulatory
response  that  would  set  down  basic  rules  that  respond  to the factual
problem.
2. DIRECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF AI SYSTEMS
Are machines legal authors of their actions? The first  question is whether
or not we can recognize AI agents as legally responsible for their behaviours
in terms of traditional criminal law theories. 
In criminal law, to impose criminal liability for intentional offences, two
main criteria must be met.14 One is the factual element (actus reus), which
contains  the criminal  conduct,  and  the other  one  is  the mental  element
(mens rea), which consists of the general intent of the offender and embodies
the idea of culpability.15 Mens rea,  in this  respect,  means a desire  or a will
to cause  a certain  consequence  as a result  of the conduct  of a person.16 It
reflect the offender’s state of mind. What about robot crime? Can we treat
autonomous intelligent  machines’  crimes under the existing criminal  law
principles?
As Calo points out,
“humans are,  or are not,  like robots,  is  a critical  distinction that  informs
the legal issue before the court”.17
In this  respect,  the relevant  question  is:  Are  AI  systems  capable  of meeting
the requirements of both factual and mental elements? Although both elements
should  be  present  to establish  criminal  liability,18 the greatest  challenge
remains the establishment of the mens rea element. How do we demonstrate
the intentions  of a non-human?  This  is  particularly  difficult  due  to AI
systems’ lack of consciousness. 
14 Hallevy,  G.  (2013)  When  Robots  Kill:  Artificial  Intelligence  under  Criminal  Law.  Boston:
Northeastern University Press, p. 85.
15 Ibid.
16 Gaur,  K.D. (2003)  Principles  of Criminal Liability.  In:  K.D. Gaur (ed.).  Criminal  Law and
Criminology. New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, p. 24.
17 Calo, R. (2016) Op. cit., p. 25.
18 Hallevy, G. (2013) Op. cit., p. 85.
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Generally, self-consciousness  represents a person’s ability  to think and
make  moral  judgments,  for  instance  judge  good  and  evil.  Thus,  from
an ethical and legal perspective, holding AI systems criminally accountable
for  their  actions  proves  to be  inappropriate,  because  they  are  not  aware
of the consequences of their actions. Such offenders are considered absent
of adequate  culpability  (nullum  crimen  sine  culpa).19 However,  from
a technical  perspective,  researchers  believe  that  robots  already  have
a rudimentary  consciousness,  referring  to  robots’  abilities  to accumulate
knowledge  and  make  judgments  accordingly,20 and  may  soon  become
human-like  entities,  or even exceed  human  intelligence.21 In light  of that,
Hallevy  suggests that a new subject be added to criminal  law, in addition
to humans  and  corporations,  to which  he  refers  as machina  sapiens
criminalis.22
2.1. LEGAL PERSONHOOD:
CAN AI SYSTEMS BE SUBJECTS OF LAW?
Many  researchers  are  looking  for  regulatory  means  to accommodate
the status  of intelligent  agents  in the legal  system and in society.  Perhaps
encouraged by the case  of two chimpanzees (Hercules  and  Leo)  who were
granted  the status  of “legal  persons”  by the Manhattan  Supreme  Court
in 2015,23 researchers  have  started  to look  at the possibility  of granting
“personhood” to AI systems. As one might expect, scholars share differing
perspectives.  It  primarily  depends  on whether  they  accept  the robot
as a legal subject, i.e. “metaphors or similes that support a particular verdict”24
or see it just as an object, i.e. “artifacts in the world that have legal disputes.”25
19 Hallevy,  G.  (2015)  Liability  for  Crimes  Involving  Artificial  Intelligence  Systems.  Springer
International Publishing, p. 33.
20 See,  Retto,  J.  (2017)  Sophia,  First  Citizen  Robot  of the World.  [online]  Available  from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321319964_SOPHIA_FIRST_CITIZEN_ROBOT_O
F_THE_WORLD [Accessed 29 November 2018] .
21 Radutniy, O.E. (2017) Op. cit., p. 136.
22 Hallevy, G. (2013) Op. cit., p. 21 (arguing that given the human-like actions of autonomous
systems,  the current  criminal  law  is  adequate  to address  AI  technology  issues.  Hallevy
continues  his  argument  by stating  that  as long  as technology  is  about  to advance  into
creating what he calls “machina sapiens” – an AI system that imitates the human mind –
current criminal law would be even more adequate to address criminal liability issues of AI
entities, since the human mind is already the subject of the current criminal law). 
23 Bekoff, M. (2015) Judge Recognizes Two Chimpanzees as Legal Persons: A First Two Chimpanzees,
Hercules  and  Leo,  Are  Determined  to Be  Persons  in NY  Court.  [online]  Available  from:
www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animal-emotions/201504/judge-recognizes-two-
chimpanzees-legal-persons-first [Accessed 29 November 2018].
24 Calo, R. (2016) Op. cit., p. 44.
25 Ibid.
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Some legal scholars argue that robots are objects created by people and,
as such,  they are perceived as items or property, which by default  cannot
possess any legal rights.26 They are merely regarded as tools in the hands
of their  producers  or owners.  This  perspective  reflects  the views
of the American writer  Isaac Asimov, who distinguishes robots as property
in the disposal of their human creators.27
In contrast, others note that AI systems are significantly different from
other objects due to their active intervention in human relations. Cerka et al.,
for example, point out that AI systems interact with other subjects of law,
thus it is imperative to recognize them as legal entities in order to be able
to clearly  define  subjects’  rights,  interests,  and  their  obligations.28 Such
rights may prove difficult to enforce and thus call for establishment of legal
provisions that accommodate the relationship between individuals and AI
systems. An interesting case, for instance, was represented by a mock trial
at the International  Bar  Association  conference  in San  Francisco
on 16 September  2013,  where  attorney  Dr. Martine  Rothblatt  addressed
the legality  of a corporation  unplugging/shutting  down  an intelligent
computer,  arguing  that  the computer  had  the right  to maintain
an existence.29 In the absence of legislation, the court could not rule whether
the AI system had the right not to be destroyed. 
At the international level, robotic rights have already gained importance.
In the autumn  of 2017,  Saudi  Arabia  granted  citizenship  to a humanoid
robot named Sophia.30 Sophia, a robot that mimicked human expressions and
26 See, for example: Radutniy, O.E. (2017) Op. cit., p. 136.
27 Asimov explores the “three law of robotics”, which are as follows: “(1) a robot may not injure
a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; (2) a robot must obey
orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; and
(3) a robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First
or Second Law”. See: Houvast, F. Timmerman, R. and Zwaan, Y. (2018) Exploring the Legal
Rights & Obligations of Robots: A Legal Book Review of I, Robot by Isaac Asimov reviewed
in Law Literature Project, Utrecht University, pp. 1–8.
28 Having regard that AI systems cannot express their will as humans do, the authors suggest
that by using legal analogy, AI entities should be viewed as artificial subjects of law, similar
to the corporate personality. See: Čerka, P., Grigienė, J. and Sirbikytė, G. (2017) Is It Possible
to Grant Legal Personality to Artificial Intelligence Software Systems?.  Computer Law and
Security Review, 33 (5), pp. 685–699.
29 Rothblatt,  M. and Angelica,  A.D. (2003)  Bio-Cyber-Ethics:  Should We Stop a Company from
Unplugging  an Intelligent  Computer?.  [blog  entry]  28  September.  Available  from:
http://www.kurzweilai.net/biocyberethics-should-we-stop-a-company-from-unplugging-
an-intelligent-computer [Accessed 24 October 2018].
30 Wootson, C. (2017)  Saudi Arabia, Which Denies Women Equal Rights, Makes a Robot a Citizen.
[online]  Available  from:  https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/saudi-arabia-which-denies-
women-equal-rights-makes-a-robot-a-citizen-1768666 [Accessed 20 January 2019].
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could learn human behaviours by interacting with people, became the first
robot in the world to received citizenship.
The leading  country  in robotics,  Japan,  also  seems  to have  settled
the question  of robot  rights.  On 7  November  2010,  a therapeutic  robot
named  Paro,  received  its  own  koseki,  a special  residency  permit,  which
in Japanese  society  conflates  legal  rights  such  as family,  nationality,  and
citizenship.31
In its  turn,  the European  Parliament  adopted  a resolution  entitled  Civil
Law on Robotics.  This  resolution envisages granting robots  a specific  legal
status as electronic persons, responsible for any damage resulting from their
autonomous decisions.32 The assumption is  that such a legal status would
allocate  liability  for  the damages  caused  by “the most  sophisticated
autonomous  robots”,  whose  decisions  are  made  independently,  without
human intervention.33 
The European  Union’s  oversight  on granting autonomous systems legal
personhood  could  be  a starting  point  for  allocating  rights  and
responsibilities to AI systems; however, this insight is  not accepted by all
scholars. In March 2018, Nathalie Nevejans, a lecturer in law at the University
of Artois,  addressed  this  issue  with  an open  letter  to the European
Commission, objecting to the legal status of robots.34 She claims that a legal
status  for  robots  would  collide  with  human  rights,  such  as:  the right
to dignity,  the right  to its  integrity,  the right  to remuneration,  or the right
to citizenship.35
It is fair to suggest that at some point in the evolution of AI, robots might
become capable of generating their own goals and intentions, thus they may
qualify  as subjects  of current  criminal  liability  law.  The next  question  is:
How does the court punish an AI robot? Can they experience blame? 
These  issues  remain  without  a clear  answer.  The traditional  criminal
justice  system  is  designed  by humans  for  humans,  making  punishment
31 Robertson, J. (2014) Human Rights vs. Robot Rights: Forecasts from Japan.  Critical Asian
Studies, 46 (4), pp. 571–598.
32 Civil  Law Rules  on Robotics,  European Parliament  Resolution  of 16  February  2017  with
Recommendations  to the Commission  on Civil  Law  Rules  on Robotics  (2015/2103(INL)),
16 February.  Available  from:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&
reference=P8-TA-2017-0051&language=EN&ring=A8-2017-0005 [Accessed 03 January 2019].
33 Paragraph 59(f) of the Resolution.
34 Robotics Open Letter. (2017) Open Letter to the European Commission Artificial Intelligence and
Robotics. [online] Available from: http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/ [Accessed 20 January
2019].
35 Ibid.
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seem out of place in the discussion of robot field. Criminal law seeks justice
by punishing offenders. Its key purpose is to establish security and order
in society. In this respect, the role of criminal law is to correct wrongdoers,
and to reintegrate them into society. Clearly, this may not be the case with
robots,  as they are different from humans in many aspects.  Many human
attributes  could  not  apply  to robots,  such  as:  fear,  pain,  freedom
of movement, etc. In this respect, robot imprisonment would be pointless.
Therefore, the question of robot “personhood” remains an open debate with
inconclusive results. 
3. STRICT LIABILITY: AI AS A TOOL
In legal  research,  many  scholars  share  the opinion  that  the legal
responsibility for the actions of AI systems falls on the individual who has
produced or owns the robot. For instance, Asaro explains that robots qualify
as built  systems  where  the schemes  are  chosen  by designers,
so the designers  and  programmers  of the learning  methods  would  be
responsible  for  the machine’s  actions.36 Hallevy  expands  on this  idea.  He
introduces  the Perpetration-by-Another  Liability  Model.37 According  to this
model,  AI  entities  are  considered  innocent  agents –  machines  with  no
human  attributes –  and  therefore  an AI  system  could  not  be  regarded
as a perpetrator of an offence. Pursuant to this model, the real perpetrator is
the  programmer  of the robot,  who  designs  a software  with  certain
instructions leading the robot  to commit  certain offences.  In this  scenario,
although the conduct (actus reus) falls upon the AI, the intent (mens rea) is
determined by the programmer’s mental state.38 The user of AI can also be
considered  as the perpetrator-by-another.  Hallevy  explains  that  AI  is
completely  dependent  on its  user  (end-user)  who  uses  it  with  the intent
to commit offences.39
 It is important to note that this model suggests that AI is merely a tool
(equivalent  to a hammer)  in the hands  of the programmer  or the user.  It
36 Asaro,  P.M.  (2006)  What  Should  We  Want  From  a Robot  Ethic?  International  Review
of Information Ethics, 6 (12), pp. 2–15. Available from: http://cybersophe.com/writing/Asaro
IRIE.pdf [Accessed 20 January 2019].
37 Hallevy, G. (2010) Op. cit., pp. 9–12.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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lacks  the mens  rea  element,  hence  the fault  cannot  be  attributed  to the AI
itself.40
This  perspective  imposes  non-fault  liability  and  is  similar  to product
liability regulated by the Directive 85/374/EEC.41 According to this Directive,
strict  liability  is  imposed  as a result  of a manufacturing  defect.42
If the defective product causes an injury, producers are held strictly liable
for that injury.43
Relying  on the abovementioned  analysis,  AI  systems  are  regarded
as tools  in the hands of the sellers,  distributors,  and users,  and liability  is
imposed,  not  because  of their  wrong  acts,  but  due  to their  specific
relationship with the AI systems. The behaviour of an AI system is directly
linked with the natural person on whose behalf it acts, therefore that person
is  held  accountable  for  any  injury  caused  by the AI  system,  regardless
of whether  such  conduct  was  intentional  or planned.  This  view  reflects
the concept of vicarious liability, according to which someone is held liable
for  the wrongs  of others,  such  as,  for  example,  employers  who  are
vicariously  liable  for  the wrongdoings  of their  employees.44 Summarizing
the idea  of robot-as-tools  based  on the concept  of vicarious  liability,  AI
systems are regarded as agents acting on behalf of several individuals that
could  be  considered  as perpetrators,  such  as:  the producer,
the programmer,  the designer,  the seller,  the distributor,  the user
of the robot, etc. 
Yet,  by comparing  the parent-child  relationship,  Sparrow  implies  that
product liability could not apply to programmers and robots, as it would be
analogous to
40 Freitas, P.M., Andrade, F. and Novais, P. (2014) Criminal Liability of Autonomous Agents:
From  the Unthinkable  to the Plausible.  In:  Pompeu  Casanovas,  Ugo  Pagallo,  Monica
Palmirani and Giovanni Sartor (eds.). AI Approaches to the Complexity of Legal Systems. Berlin:
Springer, p. 150.
41 Council  Directive  85/374/EEC  of 25  July  1985  on the Approximation  of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products.  Official  Journal  of the European Union (L 210),  25 July.  Available from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31985L0374
[Accessed 23 January 2019].
42 Article 1 states: “The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product”. Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 For  an overview  of vicarious  liability,  see:  Lederman,  E.  (2000)  Models  for  Imposing
Corporate  Criminal  Liability:  From  Adaptation  and Imitation  Toward  Aggregation  and
the Search For Self-Identity. Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 4 (1), pp. 641–708.
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“holding parents responsible for the actions of their children once they have
left their care”.45
Perhaps  this  reasoning  should  be  given  importance  in the liability  chain,
due  to AI  systems’  ability  to make  independent  decisions  and  change
behaviour through machine learning, making it very difficult to determine
the cause-effect  link  between  AI  and  the responsible  participant.  In this
respect,  strict  liability  might  be  a too  heavy  a burden  on the producers
or owners of the robot. Besides that, substantially different ways to resolve
liability  issues  lead  to potential  legal  errors.46 Courts  are  likely  to adopt
different  solutions,  leading  to widespread  disagreement  in the general
public  and among manufacturers  trying  to assess  their  potential  liability
in the national market.47 Furthermore, an excessive blameworthiness could
obstruct the progress of technology development and all its benefits would
be lost.48
The practical solution lies in devising mechanisms of accountability that
promote  innovation  and development  of advanced  autonomous  artificial
agents that benefit  society, while effectively managing the risks and their
harmful  actions.  In addressing  the need  to incentivise  safety  without
ruining  robot  supply  in the market,  Calo  argues  in favour  of providing
protection  to manufacturers  and  distributers  of open  robotics,  similar
to the immunity of gun manufacturers.49
3.1. NEGLIGENCE-BASED LIABILITY
Negligence imposes liability only if the defendant is at fault.50 To simplify,
liability  in negligence  in a criminal  context  arises  if there  is  a reasonable
45 Sparrow, R. (2007) Killer Robots. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24 (1), p. 62.
46 Geistfeld,  M.A.  (2017)  A Roadmap  for  Autonomous  Vehicles:  State  Tort  Liability,
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation. California Law Review, 105, p. 1611.
47 Ibid.
48 Čerka et al. (2017) Op. cit., p. 689; See also: Gless, S. Silverman, E. and Weigend, T. (2016)
If Robots Cause Harm, Who Is  to Blame? Self-Driving Cars and Criminal Liability.  New
Criminal  Law  Review,  19 (3),  p. 430.;  see  also  Hubbard,  P.  (2014)  'Sophisticated  Robots’:
Balancing Liability,  Regulation, and Innovation.  Florida Law Review,  66 (5),  pp. 1803–1872
(explaining that  “All technology presents the challenge of balancing its costs against its benefits.
First, the expanded potential liability of innovators could negatively affect their decision to develop,
for example, an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). Second, the increased liability could also reduce
the demand for a robotic vehicle like a UAS because purchasers and users would need to worry about
potential greater liability for personal injury”).
49 Calo, R. (2011) Open Robotics.  Maryland Law Review, 70 (3), pp. 101–142.  Available from:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706293 [Accessed 25 January 2019].
50 Kelley,  R.  et al.  (2010)  Liability  in Robotics:  An International  Perspective  on Robots
as Animals. Advanced Robotics, 24 (13), pp. 1861–1871.
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duty of care. A negligent  action is  something a rational  individual would
not  do.  For  example,  texting  on the phone  while  driving  qualifies
as negligence.
Negligence  is  the failure  to use  reasonable  care  to prevent  harm
to oneself  or to others.  A person  can  be  negligent  by acting  or by failing
to act. A person is negligent if he or she does something that a reasonably
careful person would not do in the same situation or fails to do something
that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation.51
It seems logical that a person who has suffered a harm by an AI system
files  a suit  against  the agent  that  failed  to provide  due  care,  i.e. to do
something  that  is  morally  and  legally  required.  Other  researchers  share
the same opinion.  Roff,  for instance, points out that the responsibility and
liability lie with the software programmers. She discusses that the burden
of legal responsibility falls upon programmers or the manufacturers,  who,
having the status of the creators of the machine, are legally responsible for
providing  warnings  and  taking  necessary  measures  to avoid  any  risk.52
In accordance  with  this  view,  Hallevy  argues  that  the programmer
or the user  of the robot  is  liable  when  he  or she  has  failed  to foresee
the offence  committed  by the robot  and  failed  to prevent  it.53 In Hallevy’s
research,  this  is  called  the Natural-Probable-Consequence  liability  model.54
According to this model, there is a link between the AI system’s offence and
manufacturer’s or user’s action. Even though the manufacturer or the user
had no intent  to commit  an offence,  if there is  evidence  that  they should
have  taken  corrective  measures  to prevent  the happening,  they  are  held
accountable.55 This model is based on the duty of reasonable programmers
and  manufacturers  to foresee  potential  wrongdoings  of the robots,
i.e. to ensure  that  their  products  have  no  design  flaws  and  to avoid
obstacles by warning consumers of hidden dangers. 
Criminal liability based on negligence relies on the assumption that none
of the aforementioned  individuals  intended  to cause  harm  to another
51 Judicial Council of California. (2017)  California Civil Jury Instruction 2017 Edition (“CACI”)
No.401.  [online]  Available  from: https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/400/401/
[Accessed 20 December 2018].
52 Roff, H.M. (2013) Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability and Lethal Autonomous Robots.
In: Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas Evans and Adam Henschke (eds.).  Routledge Handbook of Ethics
and War: Just War Theory in the 21st Century. Routledge Press, p. 356.
53 Hallevy, G. (2010) Op. cit., pp. 15, 16.
54 Ibid, p. 9.
55 Ibid, pp. 14, 15.
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human  being,  thus  the liability  arises  due  to lack  of reasonable  care,
i.e. a rational  person should have acted to avoid  damage.  This  resembles
the relationship  between owners  and domesticated animals.56 Kelley at al.
note that
“robot  owners  should  be  held  liable  for  negligence  with  respect  to their
robots,  much like  dog  owners  are  held  liable  for  negligence  with  respect
to their dogs”.57
In this  sense,  manufacturers,  sellers,  or distributors  are  criminally  liable
when they have failed to warn about a foreseeable risk or they have failed
to give adequate instructions to avoid harm. 
However,  it  is  very  difficult  to impose  liability  based  on negligence.
Most importantly, it is not clear how to determine the standards of care. Let
us imagine that instructions to avoid a risk in a given situation are provided
in due  time.  The next  question  is:  Was  that  warning  or instruction
reasonable? Currently there are no international legal norms determining
safety requirements of AI systems upon which plaintiffs can rely in a certain
situation. The acquisition of autonomy and the self-learning capacity of AI
systems  makes  it  difficult  to predict  their  behaviours  and  to determine
possible risks and threats, therefore it is not an easy task for victims who
have the burden of proof to allocate the “fault”. For example, if someone is
injured  by an autonomous  robot  that  is  designed  to learn  and to interact
with  the environment,  it  may be  hard to identify  what  went  wrong and
what  caused  the accident.  Additionally,  due  to the large  number
of individuals involved in the process of manufacturing, it is unclear which
agent among multiple component suppliers of hardware and software has
the duty to avoid risks.
3.1.1. FORESEEABILITY
To impose  criminal  liability  based  on negligence,  it  is  important
to determine  whether  the manufacturer  could  anticipate  the potential
malfunctions of the AI system. Prediction theory is central to negligence.58
Negligence  arises  when  a reasonably  prudent  person  “ought  to have
56 Kelley,  R.  et  al.  (2010)  Op.  cit.,  p. 1864  (explaining:  “We  justify  this  negligence  analysis
by analogizing  robots  to domesticated  animals,  whose  owners  are  as a general  rule  subject
to negligence liability because such animals are generally predictable”).
57 Ibid.
58 Karnow, C.E.A. (2013) Op. cit., p. 9.
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known” that his actions would cause harm.59 In traditional product liability,
the manufacturer is responsible for the product if he could foresee potential
problems  or harms  it  may  cause.  The verb  “to foresee”  means  “to have
prescience of; to know in advance”.60
Foreseeability
“is  not  to be  measured by what  is  more  probable  than  not,  but includes
whatever  is  likely  enough  in the setting  of modern  life  that  a reasonably
thoughtful [person] would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.”61
Early robotic machines, such as automated elevators, have been subject
to liability  claims  based  on the duty  of the manufacturer  to provide
reasonable care, i.e. to undertake safety measures to prevent risk or harm.
Plaintiffs  have  sued  for  injuries  caused  by lack  of due  care
in the maintenance  of these  machines.62 However,  there  are  no  easy
guidelines to determine whether the risk or physical harm is “foreseeable”
for sophisticated and autonomous robots.
To effectively address responsibility  and blame, as noted by Owen,  we
must  first  determine the individual’s  ability  to understand that  the action
might  cause  harm  and  that  opting  for  another  action  would  be  a safer
alternative,  in accordance  to individual’s  obligations  to the community.63
The responsibility  of manufacturers,  distributors,  and users of AI systems
thus depend upon their capacity to understand the behaviour patterns of AI
systems, the causal possibilities of AI systems’ actions, and expected results.
When  it  comes  to intelligent  robots  and  their  ability  to learn  from
environmental  data,  designers  and  users  may  not  have  a feasible  way
to predict  their  behaviour,  simply  because  machine  learning  techniques
59 Ibid, p. 10.
60 Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. (2001) 2nd ed.
61 Constance B. v. State of California. (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 200,206. Available from: https://law.
justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/178/200.html [Accessed 20 December 2018].
62 See,  e.g. Estabrook  v. J.C.  Penney  Co. (1970)  464  P.2d  325  (In Banc.).  Available  from:
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1247130/estabrook-v-jc-penney-company/
[Accessed 20 December 2018] (The plaintiff sued for injuries incurred while he was playing
on an escalator);  Brown  v. Sears,  Roebuck  &  Co. (1987)  514  So.  2d  439.  Available  from:
https://law.justia.com/cases/louisiana/supreme-court/1987/87-c-0726-0-1.html  [Accessed
20 December 2018] (A twenty-two month old child caught his finger in the space between
the moving  treads  and  the left  side  panel  of the elevator.  The court  ruled  in favor
of the plaintiff).
63 Owen, D. (2009) Figuring Foreseeability. Wake Forest Law Review, 44, pp. 1277–1307.
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allow  AI  systems  to modify  their  functions  and  learn  after  they  are
deployed.64
The second  factor  in determining  responsibility  is  evaluation
of the actor’s decision;65 whether it was the right decision that would have
prevented  the risk.  This  is  often  left  to the judges  to decide.  As stated
earlier, foreseeability is an abstract and vague concept, and in many cases
cannot  be  proven  in court.  Some  argue  that  judges  use  the doctrine
of foreseeability as a means to weed out cases they deem unworthy;66 that
is, the judges use “foreseeability” as a means of deciding whether the action
was right or wrong, upon which they impose or deny negligence liability.
This can lead to different judgments for similar cases.67
 Having said that, concepts like “foreseeability” and “reasonable care”
cannot  be  used  as key  elements  to impose  criminal  liability
on manufacturers and sellers, as they may simply not have the level of skill
required to foresee the manner in which the harm will occur. Consequently,
standards  of reasonable  care  may  be  vague.  In addition,  any  attempt
to impose  responsibility  on such a basis  could lead to infinite  liability  for
creators  of AI  systems  that  could  obstruct  the economy  and  innovation
of AI.
4. AI LIABILITY GAP:
A LOOK INTO CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
So far,  we have seen that imposing criminal  liability for the harmful and
erratic behaviours of robots often leads us to a vicious circle due to the fact
that  it  is  often  very  difficult  to attribute  responsibility  to specific
individuals.  When addressing the AI accountability gap, there are always
two  parties  in the centre  of the debate:  those  who  develop  AI,  i.e. big
64 Asaro,  P.M.  (2016)  The Liability  Problem  for  Autonomous  Artificial  Agents.  In:  Bipin
Indurkhya and Georgi Stojanov (eds.). AAAI Symposium on Ethical and Moral Considerations
in Non-Human  Agents,  Stanford,  21–23  March.  USA:  Association  for  the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence, pp. 190–194. Available from: https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/
SSS/SSS16/paper/view/12699 [Accessed 29 December 2018].
65 Ibid.
66 See,  e.g. Cardi,  W.J.  (2005)  Purging Foreseeability:  The New Vision of Duty and Judicial
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts.  Vanderbilt  Law Review,  58 (3),  p. 739.
Available  from:  https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/handle/10339/58895  [Accessed  15  October
2018] (explaining “In many courts the foreseeability lens seems to expand, contract or change focus
at the will  of the judge”);  See  also:  Owen,  D.  (2009)  Op.  cit.,  p. 1278  (arguing  “while
foreseeability may be the fundamental moral glue of tort, it provides so little decisional guidance that
scholars often revile it for being vague, vacuous, and indeterminate”).
67 Cardi, WJ. (2005) Op. cit., p. 740.
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companies; and those who are directly impacted from such development,
i.e. society.68 Anticipating  an exponential  growth  of technology,  it  seems
that  this  gap  is  going  to accelerate  in the future.  Importantly,  this  paper
examines  whether  accountability  should  be  imposed  over  institutions,
i.e. corporations, rather than individuals.
The need  for  corporate  liability  cannot  be  understood  without
an understanding  of the great  dominance  and  influence  of the private
sector.  There  are  two  key  factors  that  ensure  corporations’  great  digital
power and dominance: data collection and money. 
With  the advent  of globalisation,  multinational  corporations69 wield
tremendous financial power. As noted by Pasquale, these dominant players
control money and information.70 Today a great amount of digital power is
concentrated  in the hands  of just  a few  people.  This  is  a threat  both
to democracy and to functioning markets.71 At the core of their reputation,72
search,73 and finance74 lies our data, which too often is stored and processed
under  secrecy.75 The big  tech  companies,  in particular  the “Frightful  5”76
(Google,  Facebook,  Amazon,  Apple, and Microsoft) control and collect the data
and  information  of billions  of people,77 which  is  often  used  to shape
consumers’  behaviour  and  maximize  profit.78 Indeed,  as Bryson  and
Theodorou point out,
68 See: Whittaker, M.  et al. (2018)  AI Now Report. [online] New York City: AI Now Institute.
Available from: https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf
[Accessed 19 December 2018].
69 The term “multinational corporation” is defined as “an economic entity, which owns (in whole
or in part),  controls  and  manages  income  generating  assets  in more  than  one  country”.  For
the detailed  review,  see:  Muchlinski,  P.T.  (2007)  Multinational  Enterprises  and  the Law.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 12.
70 Pasquale,  F.  (2015)  The Black  Box  Society:  The Secret  Algorithms  That  Control  Money  and
Information. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 4–6.
71 Nemitz,  P.  (2018)  Constitutional  Democracy  and  Technology  in the Age  of Artificial
Intelligence.  [in press]  Submitted  to:  Philosophical  Transactions  of the Royal  Society  A.
Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3234336 [Accessed 07 January 2019].
72 Pasquale, F. (2015) Op. cit., p. 4.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 See: Manjoo, F. (2016) Tech’s ‘Frightful 5’ Will Dominate Digital Life for Foreseeable Future.
N.Y.  Times,  20  January.  [online] Available  from:  https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/
technology/techs-frightful-5-will-dominate-digital-life-for-foreseeable-future.html
[Accessed 10 January 2019].
77 Chadwick,  P.  (2018)  To Regulate  AI  We  Need  New  Laws,  Not  Just  a Code  of Ethics.
The Guardian, 28 October.  [online] Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2018/oct/28/regulate-ai-new-laws-code-of-ethics-technology-power  
[Accessed 20 January 2019].
78 Nemitz, P. (2018) Op. cit.
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“with great power (or even just money) does come great responsibility”.79
Consequently, the big question is: Should corporations be held accountable
for criminal actions arising from the tools they deploy in the market?
The “deep pockets” of the corporations might give us the answer to this
question.  Organisational  blameworthiness,  in this  regard,  derives  from
the profit-driven expansion of mega corporations’ commercial activities.  It
seems  legitimate  and  necessary  to allocate  the threats  by recurring
accountability to those who collect the fruits of AI deployment. Otherwise,
the struggle to impose liability for the harmful actions of AI systems would
provide  room  for  big  corporations  to expand  their  businesses,  while
potential  harmful  acts  of intelligent  machines  would  remain  a constant
threat to society.
As noted by a report  published in 2018,  the accountability  gap in AI is
favourable  for  the companies  that  create  and  deploy  these  technologies,
at the expense  of society’s  interest.80 Hence,  a limited  and  unregulated
corporation  liability  may  encourage  corporations  to take  greater  risks –
socially  harmful  risks –  in order  to maximize  their  profit.  Anderson  and
Luchsinger share the same concerns:
“Most AI tools are and will be in the hands of companies striving for power.
Values and ethics are often not baked into digital systems making people’s
decision  for  them.  These  systems  are  globally  networked  and  not  easy
to regulate or rein in”.81
The big  tech lobby campaigns  against  the law82 give credence to these
concerns.  It  demonstrates  their  efforts  to avoid  responsibility  at all  cost.
The internet giants are the only corporations in history that have managed
79 Bryson, J. and Theodorou, A. (2019) How Society Can Maintain Human-Centric Artificial
Intelligence. In: Marja Toivonen and Eveliina Saari (eds.). Human Centered Digitalization and
Services. Singapore: Springer, pp. 305–323. Available from: http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~jjb/ftp
/BrysonTheodorou19.pdf [Accessed 20 January 2019].
80 Whittaker et al. (2018) Op. cit.
81 Anderson,  J.  Rainie,  L.  and  Luchsinger,  A.  (2018)  Artificial  Intelligence  and  the Future
of Humans.  [online]  Washington,  DC:  Pew  Research  Center.  Available  from:
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/12/10/artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-humans/
[Accessed 23 January 2019].
82 For  the latest  big  tech  lobby  campaigns  against  new  law,  see:  Meyer,  D.  (2017)  Inside
the EPrivacy Regulation’s Furious Lobbying War. [online] Kansas City: IAAP. Available from:
https://iapp.org/news/a/inside-the-eprivacy-regulations-furious-lobbying-war/  [Accessed
23 January 2019]; Fang, L. (2018) Google and Facebook Are Quietly Fighting California’s Privacy
Rights  Initiative,  Emails  Reveal.  [online]  First  Look  Media.  Available  from:  https://the
intercept.com/2018/06/26/google-and-facebook-are-quietly-fighting-californias-privacy-
rights-initiative-emails-reveal/ [Accessed 23 January 2019].
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to maximize  their  profit  at the top  of the stock  exchange,  and at the same
time maintain their output largely unregulated.83 Therefore, to shape their
practice  in the common  good,  there  is  an urgent  need  for  sector-specific
regulation.  Without  a regulation  that  goes  beyond  ethical  standards,
principles  like  justice  and  accountability  will  remain  conflict  concepts
between  mega-companies  and  the common  good  of the general  public.
Ethical  codes,  without  enforceable  mechanisms,  have  little  or no  effect
regarding AI’s social implications and liability problems. It seems that some
of these companies have realized the complexity of the problem and have
come  to the same  conclusion.  A representative  of Microsoft,  for  instance,
calls  for  establishment  of a new  field  of law  governing  “a growing  pool
of businesses involved”.84
Following the great impact corporations have in the development of AI,
coupled with the difficulty to assign individual criminal liability and moral
responsibility  for  crimes  committed  by intelligent  robots,  the discussion
about  holding  corporations,  rather  than  individuals,  responsible  is  both
timely  and  topical.  The nature  of the debate  should  now  move  on from
“whether” legal entities should have criminal liability, to “how” to properly
address and regulate their responsibility in the field of AI.
4.1. CONSIDERING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
As an initial matter, corporate liability is not a new concept. The advances
in communication  technologies  and  the rise  of consumer  activism
in the mid-twentieth century brought a public debate regarding the impact
of large  multinational  enterprises  towards  society.85 The rise  of social
responsibility  movement  caused  a shift  from  the state-centred  concerns
of corporate  regulations  (focusing  on problems  such  as taxation  and
corruption) towards people-centred approaches, mainly focusing on health
and safety issues.86
Given  the great  impact  corporations  have  had  on the economy,
particularly  railroads,  the need  to impose  criminal  liability  to large
83 Nemitz, P. (2018) Op. cit.
84 Bass, D. (2018) Microsoft Says AI Advances Will Require New Laws, Regulations. [online] New
York City: Bloomberg L.P. Available from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
01-18/microsoft-says-ai-advances-will-require-new-laws-regulations  [Accessed  21  January
2019].
85 Zerk,  J.A.  (2006)  Multinationals  and  Corporate  Social  Responsibility:  Limitations  and
Opportunities in International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 21.
86 Ibid, p. 23.
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corporations  was  acknowledged  by courts  in the late  nineteenth  century.
The courts  began  to apply  criminal  sanctions  to corporations  for  actions
committed  by individuals.87 In the years  to come,  the traditional  principle
of societas  delinquere  non  potest88 gradually  faded  away.  As a result,  most
national jurisdictions recognise corporations as legal persons, and have put
in place  domestic  legislation  that  regulate  the imposition  of criminal
liability of corporations.89 From a legal standpoint, then, corporate liability
could fill the gap of accountability issues regarding autonomous systems.
There are several  theories  widely  adopted to impose  criminal  liability
of corporations.90 Generally,  corporate  liability  is  imposed  indirectly,
through the acts of their agents, such as, for instance, vicarious liability and
respondeat  superior.91 This  represents  a nominalist  approach  under  which
corporation’s  liability  is  induced  from  the individual  liability  of its
representatives.92 In these cases, a plaintiff would need to prove that there is
an agent  or group  of agents  upon  whose  erratic  conducts  the company’s
liability can be established. The liability of a company, therefore, does not
represent  an independent  wrongdoing,  but  arises  due  to its  legal
relationship  with  these  individuals.93 The search  for  the rogue  actor  and
individual  blameworthiness  brings  to light  complications  inherent
in assessing fault.  As previously stated,94 in response to the argument that
an intelligent machine’s acts are unpredictable, it remains a challenge as far
as establishing individual intent. Consequently, it would be a difficult task
for  the courts  to establish  blame  and  seek  justice.  That  would  lead
to absolute impunity. 
87 Dragatsi, H. (2011) Criminal Liability of Canadian Corporations for International Crimes. Canada:
Thomson Reuters, p. 147.
88 Literally means “corporations cannot commit crimes” and postulates that legal entities do
not bear moral and criminal responsibility.  See: Stoitchkova, D. (2010)  Towards Corporate
Liability in International Criminal Law. Utrecht: Utrecht University, p. 7.
89 Ibid.
90 For  an overview  of corporate  criminal  liability  doctrines,  see:  Suhariyanto,  B.  (2018)
Corporate  Criminal  Liability  Under  the Reactive  Corporate  Fault  to Achieve  Good
Corporate  Governance  in Indonesia.  In:  A.  Raharjo  and  T.  Sudrajat  (eds.).  The 1st
International Conference on Law, Governance and Social Justice, Purwokerto, 25–26 September.
Les Ulis:  EDP Sciences.  Available  from: https://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/
pdf/2018/15/shsconf_icolgas2018_07009.pdf [Accessed 20 January 2019].
91 See: Lederman, E. (2000) Op. cit., p. 651.
92 Colvin, E. (1995) Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability.  Criminal Law Forum, 6 (1),
p. 2.
93 Ibid.
94 See section 2 of this paper. 
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A new  concept  of corporate  liability,  undergirded  by a realistic  view
of corporations,  suggests  that  corporations  have  individual  personalities
and  intentions,  which  does  not  derive  from  the actions  of its  agents.95
The realistic  view on corporate criminal  liability could provide normative
support for law reformers. American literature in the past decade proposed
a new model of criminal liability of legal bodies, which is also based on self-
-identity doctrine and reflects the idea of modern corporations.96 According
to this approach, liability of corporations is primary. The corporate fault is
structured  by considering  a multitude  of factors,  directly  questioning
corporation’s conduct, i.e. what it ought to have known and what it ought
do have done in order to prevent harm.97
In support of the individual identity of corporations approach, it can be
argued that a theoretical shift from derivative models, and a new concept
of strict  corporate  liability  based  on the independent  identity  of the legal
body  could  alleviate  issues  at hand.  Considering  the emerging  concept
of corporations,98 and  the unprecedented  power  in their  hands,  a focus
towards  organisational  blameworthiness  could  be  a powerful  tool
in allocating  responsibility  for  the risks  associated  with  intelligent
machines.  The exponential  development  of technology  and  AI  calls  for
regulatory  framework  to address  situations  not  anticipated  before.
Policymakers acknowledge that legal entities, who have managed to attain,
to a large extent, trouble free, should be subject to criminal proceedings.99
In the absence of a particular legislation, it is imperative to look for legal
alternatives.  For instance,  corporate criminal  liability could be developed
95 See, e.g. Colvin, E. (1995) Op. cit. (“Corporations can act and be at fault in ways that are different
from the ways in which their members can act and be at fault”.); Lawrence, F. (2000) In Defense
of Corporate  Criminal  Liability.  Harvard  Journal  of Law  & Public  Policy,  23 (3),  p. 833
(discussing  that  corporations  “have  independent  identities  in the community,  based  upon
attributes-identifiable  personae  and  a capacity  to express  moral  judgments-that  substantively
distinguish  them from their  owners,  managers  and employees”.);  Bucy,  P.H. (1991) Corporate
Ethos:  A Standard for  Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability.  Minnesota  Law Review,  75,
p. 1182  (proposing  a corporate  ethos  doctrine  based  on the idea  of separate  corporate
intent).
96 Lederman, E. (2000) Op. cit., p. 678.
97 Ibid.
98 The complex  form of modern  organisations,  their  decentralised  units,  etc.  often  prevent
identifying personal liability of individual agents; therefore, the idea that the corporations
have  an individual  personality  that  does  not derive  from its  representatives  has gained
momentum in recent decades. See: Sperino, S. (2010) A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate
Liability  for  Title  VII. Faculty  Articles  and  Other  Publications  Paper  230.  Available  from:
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&https
redir=1&article=1233&context=fac_pubs [Accessed 21 January 2019].
99 Lederman, E. (2000) Op. cit., p. 644.
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through  a correlate  stream  of public  welfare  doctrine  for  strict-liability
offences.100 This theory serves two purposes: First, it represents a doctrine
that  was  designed  as a necessity  to promote  social  order  at a time  when
the industrial revolution brought many new threats to society.101 The public
welfare rules were intended to control particular  industries and activities
that  affected  public  health,  safety  or welfare.102 Similarly,  the digital
revolution has brought so many threats unknown to humans before. Taking
into  consideration  the great  socio-economic  impact  of mega-corporations,
the welfare offence doctrine could pave the way for charging corporations
with criminal offences for the harmful acts of AI. Second, this doctrine omits
the criteria  of blameworthiness;  a penalty  can  be  imposed  regardless
of the actor’s  intent,  so  the plaintiff  does  not  have  to prove  that
the defendant  acted  purposely.103 Intent  or blameworthiness  is  replaced
by the assumption  of the risk  that  the actor  bears  when  engaging
in a certain activity.104
Assumption  is  particularly  important,  as it  may  resolve  many  core
problems  facing  the liability  regime of autonomous  systems.  A particular
death  caused  by an intelligent  robot,  for  instance,  should  alarm  AI
developers with respect to the risks associated with the tools they deploy
in the market. Their failure to adopt necessary precautionary and corrective
measures should be subject to criminal liability, provided that they should
have  known  or at least  should  have  assumed  that  their  conduct  may
seriously  threaten  the community’s  safety.  Responsibility,  hence,  arises
as a burden to an entity,
“otherwise innocent, but standing in responsible relation to a public danger”.105
Examples given by Meyer illustrate my suggestion: 
A defendant  charged  with  criminal  possession  of an unregistered
firearm may be convicted even if he mistakenly thought the firearm was
100 Strict  liability  offences  are  those  where  liability  can  be  imposed  without  a mens  rea
of an actor. See section 2 of this paper. 
101 Carpenter, C.L. (2003) On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense
Model. American University Law review, 53 (2), pp. 313–391. 
102 See:  Morissette v. United States. (1952) 342 U.S. 246. Available from: https://supreme.justia.
com/cases/federal/us/342/246/ [Accessed 28 January 2019].
103 Reitz,  M.J.  (2013)  Strict  Liability  and  Public  Welfare  Offenses.  [online]  Midland:  Mackinac
Center. Available from: https://www.mackinac.org/19579 [Accessed 21 January 2019]. 
104 Carpenter, C.L. (2003) Op. cit., p. 320.
105 Morissette v. United States. (1952) Op. cit.
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registered as required; An immigrant alien may be criminally convicted for
unlawfully re-entering the United States even if she believed that she had
proper government approval to return.106
In 1994,  for  instance,  the Supreme  Court in Staples  v. United  States107
imposed strict liability to a defendant possessing an unregistered “firearm”
that  had  been  modified  into  an automatic  weapon.108 Although
the defendant  claimed  he  was  unaware  of the factual  situation  and  was
ignorant of any automatic capability of the firearm, the Court ruled that
“as long as a defendant knows that  he is  dealing with a dangerous device
of a character that places him in responsible relation to a public danger, he
should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation”.109
Is a public welfare offence doctrine the solution then? One could argue
that  it  depends  on whether  you consider  that  a serious  injury  or a death
caused by an intelligent robot is  not only a harmful event for society, but
also  a probable  consequence  of a blameworthy  negligence,  which  ought
to be identified and repressed.
4.2. QUESTIONS AND DOUBTS
Commenting  on corporate  criminal  responsibility,  Chengeta  has  observed
that  corporate responsibility  may bring jurisdictional  and cost challenges
to victims.110 Victims  would  be  faced  with  the burden  of bringing  cases
against  corporations registered in foreign countries,  thereby encountering
enormous financial costs.111
Additionally, it  is beyond dispute that an excessive burden of criminal
liability  on corporations  would  impede  innovation.  Making  corporations
fully liable means that they should not invest in advancing AI. Does society
really want this? Perhaps to some extent the general public needs to adapt
to technological advancement. That is to say, probably there should be some
106 Meyer, J.A. (2007) Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory Crimes.  Hastings
Law Journal, 59 (1), p. 138.
107 Staples v. United States. (1994) 511 U.S. 600. Available from: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/
federal/us/511/600/ [Accessed 28 January 2019].
108 Ibid.  at 602–04  (“Automatic”  refers  to a weapon  that  fires  repeatedly  with  a single  pull
of the trigger).
109 Ibid.
110 Chengeta,  T.  (2016)  Accountability  Gap:  Autonomous  Weapon  Systems  and  Modes
of Responsibility in International Law.  Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 45 (1),
p. 4. 
111 Ibid.
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safety  issues  that  should  be  socially  tolerated,  especially  when it  comes
to robots  dedicated  to social  benefits.  Some  authors112 postulate  that  we
should  look  for  an intermediate  solution,  by adjusting  legal  rules  and
by accepting  a margin  of tolerance  of certain  errors  in the designing  and
programming of robots.113
Tolerance for robot malfunctions, though, should not play a central role
in debates concerning the existence of corporate criminal liability. A variety
of potential,  harmful consequences will  also occur if there is no one to be
blamed  for  the dangers  associated  with  the use  of autonomous  systems.
Therefore,  the challenge  of balancing  technological  development  and  its
benefits in relation to its potential threats remains a future challenge.
5. CONCLUSION
The successful  development  of the robot  market  has  posed  challenging
liability issues that need to be addressed by regulators and policymakers.
There  is  no  one-size-fits-all  solution.  In the absence  of an international
regulatory framework,  finding  the person that  should be  held criminally
liable  for  the mishaps  of fully  autonomous  systems  is  not  an easy  task,
especially  due  to the complex  and  sophisticated  nature  of the machines.
The more  autonomous  the system,  the greater  the challenge  to establish
effective rules governing liability for harmful actions.
While  some  authors  suggest  that  current  criminal  law  is  a plausible
possibility  to cope  with  AI,114 this  paper  shows  that  liability  questions115
of AI systems push traditional criminal law to its limit. Old definitions are
not suitable to the modern era. 
In terms of thinking of robots as subject to the law, one could argue that
it  is  not  a straightforward  solution,  due  to the uncertainty  of many
questions facing robot ethics. While giving civic status to AI systems would
regulate  the industry  to some  extent,  many  other  problems,  such
as intention and culpability of AI systems, remain to be addressed. 
Similarly, product liability is facing challenging questions that stem from
the increasingly  sophisticated  nature  of robots  and  the many  individuals
involved  in the production  and  maintenance  of AI  systems.  It  cannot  be
112 Gless, S., Silverman, E. and Weigend, T. (2016) Op. cit., p. 17.
113 Ibid.
114 Hallevy, G. (2013) Op. cit., p. 29.
115 Questions of risk, fault and punishment remain to be addressed.
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conclusively  established because  methods  to impose  product  liability  are
not clear. 
We  argue  that  there  is  a need  for  a shift  from  an individual-centred
liability model to an organisation-centred liability model. We suggest that
corporate criminal liability is the best solution whenever the responsibility
of individual  agents  cannot  be  conclusively  established.  However,
in the absence of a particular law in the AI field, this proposition is also fit
for discussion.
The existing conflict  clearly shows that  AI systems and issues  related
to their criminal liability will remain a topic of discussion among academic
for many years to come.
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